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AbsTrACT
On 11 September 2019, the verdict was read in the 
first prosecution of a doctor for euthanasia since the 
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
(Review Procedures) Act of 2002 was installed in the 
Netherlands. The case concerned euthanasia on the basis 
of an advance euthanasia directive (AED) for a patient 
with severe dementia. In this paper we describe the 
review process for euthanasia cases in the Netherlands. 
Then we describe the case in detail, the judgement of the 
Regional Review Committees for Termination of Life on 
Request and Euthanasia (RTE) and the judgement of the 
medical disciplinary court. Both the review committees 
and the disciplinary court came to the conclusion there 
were concerns with this case, which mainly hinged on 
the wording of the AED. They also addressed the lack 
of communication with the patient, the absence of oral 
confirmation of the wish to die and the fact that the 
euthanasia was performed without the patient being 
aware of this. However, the doctor was acquitted by 
the criminal court as the court found she had in fact 
met all due care criteria laid down in the act. We then 
describe what this judgement means for euthanasia in 
the Netherlands. It clarifies the power and reach of AEDs, 
it allows taking conversations with physicians and the 
testimony of the family into account when interpreting 
the AED. However, as a practical consequence the 
prosecution of this physician has led to fear among 
doctors about prosecution after euthanasia.
InTroduCTIon
Recently the first prosecution of a Dutch physician 
since the 2002 Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act ended 
in acquittal. The verdict sheds some light on the 
requirements for an advance euthanasia directive 
(AED) in the Netherlands. Moreover, there are 
practical consequences of the prosecution, which 
may not be in line with the verdict. Here we describe 
the process of review, this case and the verdict (also 
of earlier judgements) to conclude what this case 
means for the Dutch euthanasia practice and AEDs.
The frAmework for revIew of euThAnAsIA 
CAses
The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted 
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act stipulates an 
exception from the prohibition to aid in suicide or 
to kill in the penal code, but only for physicians if 
they report the euthanasia or assisted suicide and 
act according to the requirements of due care as 
stipulated in the Act.1 These requirements are that 
the physician must:
a. Be satisfied that the patient’s request is volun-
tary and well considered.
b. Be satisfied that the patient’s suffering is un-
bearable, with no prospect of improvement.
c. Have informed the patient about his situation 
and his prognosis.
d. Have come to the conclusion, together with the 
patient, that there is no reasonable alternative in 
the patient’s situation.
e. Have consulted at least one other, independent 
physician, who must see the patient and give a 
written opinion on whether the due care criteria 
set out in (a) to (d) have been fulfilled.
f. Have exercised due medical care and attention 
in terminating the patient’s life or assisting in 
his suicide.
A physician who has performed euthanasia 
must then notify the municipal pathologist, who 
completes a form after the postmortem examina-
tion. The physician also has to provide the pathol-
ogist with a detailed report and the independent 
physician’s report.
The Act stipulates in section 2.2 that a patient 
aged 16 or over who is decisionally competent may 
draw up an advance directive, setting out a request 
for euthanasia. If at some point the patient is no 
longer capable of expressing his will, the physi-
cian may accept the advance directive as a request 
pursuant to section 2 (1)(a) of the Act.1 2 The 
advance directive thus has the same status as an oral 
request for euthanasia.
The Act further establishes the Regional Review 
Committees for Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (RTE).1 They have to judge whether 
the euthanasia was performed with due care. The 
RTEs comprised a lawyer (also the chairperson), 
a physician and a philosophical member (usually 
an ethicist or theologian). The RTEs review all 
(reported) cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Their experience is bundled in the Euthanasia Code 
2018, which gives guidelines on how to interpret 
the due care criteria.2 If the RTEs find the criteria 
for due care were met, they notify the physician and 
there is no further follow- up (this is the case for the 
vast majority of the cases: 6120 out of 6126 cases in 
2018).3 If they conclude the criteria are not met (six 
cases in 2018), the cases are forwarded to Health 
Care Inspectorate and the Public Prosecution for 
further investigation. Both can do an independent 
investigation as their focus is different. The Health 
Care Inspectorate investigates whether the physician 
acted according to professional standards, whereas 
the Prosecution focuses on whether there is a case 
for criminal liability. Since the instalment of the Act 
(which is largely based on the case law from before) 
in 2002, physicians have faced disciplinary court on 
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a number of occasions (both as a result of the investigation of the 
Inspectorate and as a result of complaints) as happened in this 
case, but it was the first case also brought before criminal court.
The CAse
The case concerned a patient with severe dementia who had 
written an AED when she was still competent (see also Miller 
et al 2019).4 In October 2012 the patient was diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease and shortly thereafter she signed a written 
euthanasia request (the AED) complete with a dementia clause 
(an additional personal declaration about the wishes regarding 
euthanasia in the case of dementia). The patient discussed the 
AED with her general practitioner (GP) and treating gerontolo-
gist at the time. Both concluded she was competent to make this 
decision and this was noted in her medical records. The patient 
discussed her wishes extensively with her family. After witnessing 
her mother and two of her brothers suffer from dementia in a 
nursing home, she decided she never wanted a similar fate for 
herself. The AED was reconfirmed at the GP visits over the 
following years (during regular three monthly checks). The 
patient updated the dementia clause in 2015; the content was 
nearly the same as the previous version:
I would like to use the legal right to be given voluntary euthanasia, 
when I think the time is right. I do not want to be placed in a 
nursing home for elderly people with dementia. I want to say 
goodbye to my loved ones in a timely and dignified manner. My 
mother in her time had been in a nursing home for 12 years before 
she died, so I have close experience of it. I know what I am talking 
about. I definitely do not want to experience this, it has traumatised 
me severely and really saddened the whole family. Trusting, that 
when the quality of my life is so low, that at my request euthanasia 
will be performed.
Decline set in during 2015. The patient was judged incompe-
tent with respect to her euthanasia request by her GP in January 
2016. Shortly thereafter she was admitted to a nursing home.
The nursing home physician was told by the patient’s husband 
that she had an AED. She investigated whether euthanasia on 
the basis of this AED was possible. She read the medical records, 
repeatedly spoke with and observed the patient. She discussed 
the case with the (former) GP, the family, the treatment team of 
the nursing home, the patient’s psychologist and an expert from 
the Expertise Centrum Euthanasie.5
She concluded that the patient was experiencing a complete 
breakdown of her person and was suffering unbearably:
The patient was agitated, restless, stressed, fearful, sad, angry and 
panicky. She cried a lot, repeatedly said she loathed it and that it 
destroyed her, and stated up to twenty times a day that she wished 
to die. Her day- night rhythm was disturbed and she roamed the 
corridors day and night. She hammered on doors and windows 
until her hands hurt. (…) This [her behaviour] led to physical 
conflicts with other residents. She also underwent physical personal 
loss of dignity, because of her great dependence and incontinence. 
(From the verdict, translation by authors)6
Medication failed to reduce this suffering.
As required the physician further consulted two independent 
physicians whether granting this euthanasia request (based on 
the AED and her current state) would meet the due care criteria, 
both agreed this was the case. In April 2016 she performed the 
euthanasia. In order to avoid confusion and (apparent) resistance 
the physician sedated the patient before the euthanasia, mixing 
the sedative in the patient’s morning coffee. These steps were 
discussed in advance with the family. The actual euthanasia was 
not discussed with the patient at that time, and the patient did 
not know she was about to die. During the performance of the 
euthanasia, the patient did respond physically to the administra-
tion of the medication, by sitting up despite the sedative. The 
patient was restrained by her family during the further perfor-
mance of the euthanasia.
eArlIer verdICTs on ThIs CAse
regional review Committees for Termination of life on 
request and Assisted suicide
The regional committees judged the case as not meeting the due 
care criteria. In particular, they considered the due care criteria 
of the voluntary and well- considered request and the profes-
sional and careful performance of the euthanasia were not met.
The RTE thought the clarity of the wording of the AED was 
lacking. They considered it multi- interpretable, as either the wish 
to have euthanasia at the time of admittance to a nursing home 
or at a time of the patient’s own choosing before admittance. 
Considering this ambiguity and the fact that the patient was now 
incompetent with respect to this decision, the RTE considered 
it prudent to err on the side of caution and not perform eutha-
nasia in such a case. As there was no actual (and oral) eutha-
nasia request at the time of the euthanasia, and the AED was not 
sufficiently clear, the RTE concluded there was no (unequivocal) 
voluntary and well- considered request.7
Second, the RTE raised concerns about the manner in which 
the euthanasia was performed, particularly the use of a sedative 
to ensure the patient would not resist the performance of the 
euthanasia, and that it is was slipped in the coffee. Moreover, 
when the patient reacted to the administration of the medi-
cation, the RTE judged the patient might have been resisting 
euthanasia. Any doubt should lead to a reconsideration of the 
performance of the euthanasia. Resistance to the procedure 
(involving needles, and so on) should, according to the RTE, 
be taken seriously, even in a patient incompetent to understand 
euthanasia and the goal of the procedure. Thus, the RTE judged 
the criterion of professional and careful administration as not 
met.7
Taken together the RTE thus judged the case as not meeting 
the requirements of due care and it was duly forwarded to both 
the Health Care Inspectorate and Criminal Prosecution for 
investigation. Both did so and the disciplinary court came to a 
final verdict (after appeal) before the case was brought to the 
criminal court.
disciplinary court
The medical disciplinary court tested the euthanasia against the 
guidelines for professional conduct, which are based on the legal 
requirements, but not exactly the same. These guidelines, both 
those drafted by the Royal Dutch Medical Association (RDMA) 
and the Euthanasia Code issued by the RTE, state that there 
should be an attempt to discuss an actual wish to die at the 
time of the euthanasia; this is not found in the Act itself.2 8 The 
disciplinary court follows the guidelines of the RDMA as they 
stand, even though there is room for discussion of this particular 
requirement. It is difficult to see whether an attempt to discuss 
the euthanasia could have been productive. The physician in 
this case said she made the conscious decision not to discuss the 
euthanasia as she believed the patient would not understand and 
only be unduly stressed.
The disciplinary court also concluded that the AED was ambig-
uous and that considering the gravity of the act of euthanasia, 
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there is no room for interpretation.9 Thus, an ambiguous AED 
cannot be sufficient to decide on the performance of euthanasia, 
and therefore the physician did not meet the criterion of ‘volun-
tary and well- considered request’. Interestingly, the disciplinary 
court did mention that a consistent and actual death wish of the 
patient at the time of the euthanasia could have allowed her to 
conclude that there was a voluntary and well- considered request 
(even though the patient was incompetent). Moreover, the disci-
plinary court held that the physician should have attempted to 
communicate the intended euthanasia with her, and not slipped 
a sedative in her coffee, even though the court accepts that the 
patient might not have understood this and it may have caused 
distress in the patient. The court considered a warning (the 
lightest possible measure) appropriate, because the physician 
had done extensive research and consultation before she came 
to her conclusions and she had been open and transparent about 
her actions and the reasons she had for them.9
JudgemenT of The CrImInAl CourT
In 2019 the case was brought before the criminal court; the 
public prosecutor focused on the voluntary and well- considered 
request requirement. The validity of the advance directive was 
questioned, and the fact that the physician had not sought the 
patient’s consent for the euthanasia. The prosecutor referred 
to the Position Paper drafted by the RDMA, which states that 
professional norm requires communication with the patient 
until the last moment.8 The prosecutor therefore stated that the 
physician should have tried to discuss the euthanasia with the 
patient, even though she was deeply demented and incompetent. 
In the criminal court the physician was acquitted of all charges 
and the court held that the physician did meet all the due care 
criteria. Here the considerations of the court are described in 
more detail.6 The prosecution has decided to take the case to 
the High Court for a Cassation in the interest of the Law; the 
physician will remain acquitted.
wording of the Aed
The judgement was that the AED was clear enough, especially in 
the context of the patient’s ongoing conversation about eutha-
nasia with her GP and a discussion of her euthanasia wish and 
the AED with her treating gerontologist, at a time both the GP 
and the gerontologist judged the patient was still competent. The 
concerns raised on the apparent ambiguity, namely the implied 
wish to choose her own time of death in the dementia clause, 
while at the same time definitely stating that she did not want to 
be placed in a nursing home, were not shared by the court.
The court judged that her desire for euthanasia once she 
needed to be admitted to a nursing home was completely clear 
in context, even though she might have preferred to be aware 
enough to have chosen her own time before. The context 
concerned her repeated discussion and confirmation of the 
euthanasia wish with her GP, her stated wish to the gerontologist 
and her repeated conversations with her husband and daughter.
The court moreover judged that oral confirmation of the 
actual wish to have euthanasia is impossible in a patient with 
advanced dementia who can neither understand her own disease, 
nor death or euthanasia. The court notes that this requirement 
for oral confirmation is not in the law, legal history or case law, 
and is therefore moot. Whether the RDMA will revise their 
guidelines to reflect this remains to be seen. Given that a deeply 
demented patient cannot understand euthanasia and what is 
practically happening, it can be best to premedicate (sedate) the 
patient before the euthanasia procedure to avoid undue stress to 
the patient.6
ConsequenCes of The JudgemenT
The Aed
This verdict means that patients with advanced dementia in the 
Netherlands can still be granted euthanasia on the basis of an 
AED, if the AED was written while the patient was still compe-
tent. This AED does not need to have the (legal) clarity sought 
by the RTE or the disciplinary court. Instead the AED can be 
read and interpreted in the context of the conversations with 
the patient noted in the medical records and the testimony of 
the family. This means that not everyone needs to consult a 
lawyer to write an AED. However on- going conversations and 
affirmations about the content of the AED with their physician 
are needed because further interpretation of the AED is usually 
necessary. In addition, a judgement of competence is necessary 
to decide whether the AED is in principle valid. The verdict now 
legally allows the interpretation of an AED based on conversa-
tions and clarifications made to their physician and others. Thus, 
the verdict helps overcome one of the intrinsic difficulties of 
drafting an AED, namely to be clear enough for the performance 
of euthanasia, and not too restrictive.
whose interests or which interests?
The judgement thus weighs in on one of the big discussions about 
advance directives in general, and AEDs in particular. There are 
those who argue that euthanasia is indefensible after an AED 
because the trajectory should be a collaborative enterprise 
between the physician and the patient.10 Some even claim an 
AED should only be used as a tool in shared decision- making,11 
which seems counterintuitive.
If one however accepts the idea of an AED, the question 
remains whose interests are at stake and should be followed. This 
is discussed extensively in the literature and often described as 
the ‘then- self versus now- self ’’ problem.12 13 The core question 
here is whether one should follow the wishes of the then- self 
as put down in the AED or follow the apparent interests of the 
person with dementia. Some claim the now- self is a new person, 
based on the huge changes in psychological identity, and that 
this new and vulnerable person should be protected even from 
his former wishes.14 Sometimes this discontinuity in psycholog-
ical identity is taken as a sign of adaptation to the disease,13 14 
although this is also much contested. Developing new values 
and interests in these cases is unlikely as a result of developing 
dementia. It has been argued that dementia does not cause a 
change in a person’s preferences, values or internal standards, 
but rather a loss of all of this as a result of cognitive decline.15
Alternatively, it can be argued that the opposition between the 
now- self versus the then- self is a false dichotomy. If one accepts 
the person with dementia as the same person as before, because 
the person is the same character in one ongoing life story with 
one narrative identity, it is not implausible to take account of the 
wishes expressed before. Den Hartogh views the person with 
dementia as ongoing and continuous with respect to the story 
of her life. He argues the most important reason to write an 
AED for dementia is the wish to not end one’s life story on such 
a completely different track, that is, with severe dementia in a 
nursing home.16 The question then becomes which interests take 
precedence. If one emphasises the importance of critical inter-
ests—as coded in the AED—versus experiential interests—as 
expressed by or observed from the patient, the earlier critical 
interests can take precedence.17
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The verdict affirms that for the law the now- self and the then- 
self are the same person, otherwise AEDs or any other advance 
directive could never be valid. Moreover, using the context to 
inform the interpretation of the AED appears in line with an 
account based on narrative identity. The judgement however 
does not mean that apparently happy, persons with advanced 
dementia can be receiving euthanasia in the Netherlands. In 
order for a physician to perform euthanasia, he or she must be 
convinced the patient in question is suffering unbearably and 
hopelessly at the time of the euthanasia. In Dutch law both 
earlier and current interests need to be in line to grant euthanasia 
on the basis of an AED. Despite ample discussion on the difficul-
ties of assessing suffering in a patient with severe dementia, no 
one had doubts about the suffering in this case
following an Aed in the absence of suffering
Although Dutch law does not allow it, we would argue that 
even in the case of a person with advanced dementia, who is 
not noticeably suffering, an AED (morally) should be followed. 
We believe that the (apparent) experiential interests of a person 
should not over- rule the existential interests laid down in an 
AED. Because it is unclear exactly what the interests of the 
person with advanced dementia are, we can only assume on the 
basis of observation. It is impossible to exclude that it might 
still be in the person’s interest to no longer exist in the state 
of advanced dementia considering the narrative unity of his life 
despite the apparent interests or absence of apparent suffering.
Moreover, the person himself is no longer able to reflect on 
his interests and weigh them himself. This weighing should have 
happened at an earlier stage when the person still had the mental 
faculties necessary. The presence of an AED (and its context in 
conversations) is a clear sign that this person considered the 
interest to avoid a particular state, namely advanced dementia, 
as his most important. During the drawing up of an AED the 
person would have (or should have) considered that he might 
be an apparently happy person with advanced dementia, and 
still considered this not to be the end of his narrative that he 
wanted. In fact many people with AEDs consider the idea that 
they will be happily watching children’s television or smearing 
shit on the wall as a nightmare and—for them—against their 
dignity. Thus, if we consider the person as continuous, we can 
grant this person, when he was still competent, the responsibility 
to guide us, as to which interests should take precedence once 
he is incompetent.
Any change of the law to accommodate our view would 
however probably lead to protests from Dutch physicians, a 
number of whom have argued that they find it morally repulsive 
to help die someone who is unaware of this. In fact, before this 
case went to court, 220 physicians placed a large advertisement 
in major Dutch newspapers, stating that performing euthanasia 
for anyone unaware is something they will never do.18
being granted euthanasia becomes more difficult
The wider impact of this verdict may ultimately lie in the fact 
the physician was prosecuted in a criminal court. Even though 
she was acquitted, the fear of being prosecuted deters Dutch 
physicians from granting euthanasia requests, even for other, far 
less controversial cases. The Dutch Centre for Euthanasia Exper-
tise (before: ‘End- of- life clinic’) observed a stark increase in the 
number of requests they received since the prosecution was 
announced and a shift towards more relatively straightforward 
cases being referred to them, for instance concerning patients 
with terminal cancer.5
ConClusIon
The end result of this judgement is that the AED is still standing 
for patients with advanced dementia in the Netherlands, and 
thus it is theoretically possible to be granted euthanasia at an 
advanced stage of dementia. However, being granted euthanasia 
on the basis of an AED with advanced dementia is not easy and 
there are a number of reasons for this.
Besides the need for an AED, preferably supported by repeated 
conversations with physicians and family while still competent, 
there is the requirement of unbearable suffering. This means 
that people with crystal clear AEDs cannot be granted eutha-
nasia if they are apparently not suffering in the advanced stages 
of dementia.
Moreover, physicians experience a serious moral boundary 
with euthanasia on the basis of an AED for patients with 
advanced dementia. Many requests for euthanasia are the begin-
ning of a shared process, in which physician and patient together 
explore the suffering, the (lack of) possibilities to alleviate that 
suffering and together reach the conclusion that there is no other 
means to reduce the suffering than euthanasia. In the case of an 
AED the physician partly has to go through this process alone, 
once the patient becomes incompetent and therefore no longer a 
real party to the process. The importance of communication and 
togetherness is often stated by physicians and should be taken 
seriously.8 10 11 It does mean that not many physicians are willing 
to perform euthanasia on a patient with advanced dementia. The 
few who are willing in principle might be deterred by this prose-
cution. So despite the outcome of the trial, it has become harder 
to be granted euthanasia in these difficult cases.
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